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Likourezos: Local Government Rezoning

ARBITRARY AND CONFISCATORY REZONING
BY NEW YORK STATE LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS: AN EXERCISE OF POLICE
POWERS OR DISCRIMINATION?
N.Y CoNST. art. iX,section 2(c) provides:
In addition to powers granted in the statute of local governments
or in any other law, (i) every local government shall have power
to adopt and amend local lmvs not inconsistent with the
provisions of this constitution or any general law relating to its
property, affairs or government and, (1i) every local government
shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent
with the provisions of this constitution or any general law
relating to the following subjects, whether or not they relate to
the property, affairs or government of such local government,
except to the extent that the legislature shall restrict the adoption
of such a local law relating to other than the property, affairs or
government of such local government.l
INTRODUCTION

In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,2 zoning received its
"constitutional blessing from the United States Supreme Court as
a constitutionally sound manifestation of a local government's
police power, and the hegemony of modem zoning began." 3
Following Village of Euclid, a local government's decision to
apply a particular zoning classification to a piece of land must be
upheld against a substantive due process challenge unless it is
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
1. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § (2)(c).
2. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3. Joel Kosman, Toward an Inclsionary Jurisprudence: A
Reconceptualizationof Zoning, 43 CATH.U. L. REv. 59, 60 (1993).
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4
relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.'
A local government may enact zoning ordinances and apply

zoning classifications to accomplish a great variety of public
purposes .5
In the State of New York, the power to zone stems from the
state legislature 6 and the state constitution. 7 The New York Court
4. Village.of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197

U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905).
5. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The Court stated:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.... The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
Id. at 33.
6. N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 261-84 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1990). Section
261 provides:
For the purposes of promoting the health, safety, morals, or the general
welfare of the community, the town board is hereby empowered by
ordinance to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size
of buildings and other structures, and the percentage of lot that may be
occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the density of
population, and the location and use of buildings, structures and land for
trade, industry, residence or other purposes; provided that such
regulations shall apply to and affect only such part of a town.
Id.; N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §§ 7-700 to 7-742 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1990).
The same broad powers are similarly shared by villages pursuant to the Village
Law § 7-700, which provides:
For the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, or the general
welfare of the community, the board of trustees of a village is hereby
empowered, by local law, to regulate and restrict the height, number of
stories and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot
occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open spaces, the density of
population, and the location of use of buildings, structures and land for
trade, industry and other purposes.
Id.
7. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2. Section 2(c) provides:
In addition to powers granted in the statute of local governments or in
any other law, (i) every local government shall have power to adopt and
amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution
or any general law relating to its property, affairs or government and,
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of Appeals in 1987 acknowledged that zoning is a legislative
function. 8 Further, according to the court, municipalities in New
York have "broad power ...

to implement land use controls to

meet the increasing encroachments of urbanization on the quality
of life." 9 However, municipalities are not obliged to state the

(ii) every local government shall have power to adopt and amend local
laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any
general law relating to the following subjects, whether or not they relate
to the property, affairs or government of such local government, except
to the extent that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such a local
law relating to other than the property, affairs or government of such
local government.
Id.
8. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 130,
511 N.E.2d 67, 70, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924, 926 (1987). *InBrookhaven, the court
noted that "[z]oning... is an essentially legislative task, and it is therefore
anomalous that courts should be required to perform the tasks of a regional
planner." Id.
9. Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 550-51, 540 N.E.2d 215,
217, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141 (1989) (holding that due to their legislative
nature, zoning ordinances "enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality and
if there is a reasonable relation between the end sought to be achieved and the
means adopted to achieve it the regulation will be upheld"). See Village of
Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (stating that the police power
vested in a local government "is ample to lay out zones where family values,
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a
sanctuary for people"); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Town of East Hampton, 82
A.D.2d 551, 442 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't 1981). In Curtiss-Wright, the court
stated:
[If the validity of the legislative classifications for zoning purposes are
fairly debatable, they must be allowed to stand.... Here, two of the
stated goals of the East Hampton land use plan are to maintain the
natural and rural qualities of the land and control urbanization and to
conserve and protect the town's water supply. Maintenance of natural
and rural qualities have long been recognized as legitimate governmental
purposes.
Id. at 556, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
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specific public goals to be achieved by rezoning the piece of
land. 10
This Comment provides a general overview of the decisional
law followed in New York State in adjudicating cases relating to
land use regulations which are challenged as arbitrary and
confiscatory, thereby effecting a "taking." Part I of this
Comment discusses the relevant standard of review used by New
York State courts to adjudicate such cases. In addition, the
relevant evidentiary standard used by the courts in determining
whether the local government gave forethought to the
community's land use problems prior to the rezoning is also
discussed.
Part II examines various cases where the United States
Supreme Court or the New York State courts found that a
rezoning regulation by a local government either constituted or
did not constitute a "taking." This Part also discusses the remedy
available to a party when the court finds the regulation has been
arbitrary or has effected a "taking." Part m discusses when
rezoning regulations are generally found to violate the Equal
Protection Clause, thereby providing a remedy under section
1983.11 In conclusion, this Comment summarizes the law
currently followed in New York State in the adjudication of land
use regulation which is challenged as arbitrary and confiscatory.
10. See Pompa Constr. Corp. v. City of Saratoga Springs, 706 F.2d 418,
422 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating "the [Federal [e]onstitution does not require [the
zoning plan] to contain a specific explanation for each prohibition against a
particular land use").
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
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I. STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Relevant Standardof Review
The United States Supreme Court has articulated principles
which provide the relevant standard of review in cases involving
zoning and land use regulations which are challenged as arbitrary
or as confiscatory. First, the Supreme Court in 1980 enunciated a
two-part test in Agins v. City of Tiburon.12 The two-part Agins
test states that (1) government regulations must substantially
advance legitimate governmental interests, 13 and (2) must not
deny an owner economically viable use of his land, 14 or have the
effect of substantially frustrating investment backed
expectations. 15 The New York Court of Appeals first applied the
two-part Agins test in SeavallAssociates v. City of New York. 16
The second principle articulated by the Supreme Court is that
the taking determination involves a balancing of public and
private interests. 17 For example, in Village of Euclid,18 the
landowner challenged the constitutionality of a municipal
ordinance that restricted commercial development of his
property. 19 Despite alleged diminution in value of the owner's
land, the United States Supreme Court held that the zoning laws
were facially constitutional; 20 they bore a substantial relationship
12. 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (stating that when governmental action is
construed as a taking, the burden of an exercise of state power in the public
interest is therefore on the public at large rather than upon the single owner).
13. Id. at 260.
14. Id.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1989).
Agins, 447 U.S. at 261..
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id. at 396.
Id. at 397.
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to the public welfare, and their enactment inflicted no irreparable
1
injury upon the landowner. 2
A third principle in the "taking" analysis is the proportionality
of private burden and public benefit. 22 Finally, the Supreme
Court has stated that "fairness and justice" should underlie all
23
taking determinations.
B. Relevant Evidentiary Standard
In New York, similar to most jurisdictions, the long-standing
rule is that amendments to a zoning regulation must be made in
accordance with a comprehensive plan.24 The purpose of such a
statutory requirement is to ensure that the amendment is
calculated to benefit the entire community, as well as to protect
against arbitrary restrictions upon an individual's land use. 2 5 The
concern is not "'whether the zones, in themselves, are balanced
communities, but whether the town itself, as provided by its
zoning ordinances, will be a balanced and integrated
community. '26

It is well-settled that "a municipality may not legitimately
exercise its zoning power to effectuate socio-economic or racial

21. Id.
22. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 846, n.4 (1987);
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226 (1986).
23. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
24. Asian Ams. for Equality v. Koch, 72 N.Y.2d 121, 131, 527 N.E.2d
265, 270, 531 N.Y.S.2d 782, 787 (1988) (stating that "[t]he power to zone is
derived from the Legislature and must be exercised in the case of towns and
villages in accord with a 'comprehensive plan'").
25. Id.
26. Id. at 133, 527 N.E.2d at 272, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 789 (quoting Berenson
v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 109, 341 N.E.2d 236, 234, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672, 679 (1975)); cf. Tilles Inv. Co. v. Town of Huntington, 137
A.D.2d 118, 528 N.Y.S.2d 386 (2d Dep't 1988) (rejecting a challenge as a
restrictive residential zoning ordinance where the owner claimed that the
surrounding area had become commercial or industrial), aff'd, 74 N.Y.2d 885,
547 N.E.2d 90, 547 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1989).
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discrimination." 27 Thus, a zoning ordinance will be invalidated if
it was "enacted with an exclusionary purpose, or it ignores
28
regional needs and has an unjustifiably exclusionary effect."
However, there is a strong presumption of constitutionality
afforded zoning ordinances and amendments, and the burden
rests upon the party attacking its validity. 2 9 The burden of proof
30
must be met beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, New York decisional law only mandates
"'comprehensiveness of planning... not slavish servitude to any
particular comprehensive plan."

31

A court generally considers

whether the planning preceded the rezoning; whether the local
government gave forethought to the community's land use

problems; whether the amendment was consistent with those

27. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 129,
511 N.E.2d 67, 69, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924, 926 (1987). See Allan Mallach,
Affordable Housing Forum, 7 TouRo L. REv. 183, 188 (1990) (noting that a
zoning ordinance "inherently discriminates against the provision of low cost or
affordable housing" when that ordinance makes the development of multifamily housing harder to achieve).
28. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 343,
414, N.E.2d 680, 682, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (1980). See Tilies Inv. Co., 74
N.Y.2d at 885, 547 N.E.2d at 90, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 835. The court stated that
a town's plan is presumed to be constitutional, and a challenge to an upzoning
to residential will not rebut the constitutionality of the ordinance if the new
classification is fairly questionable. Id. at 888, 547 N.E.2d at 91, 547
N.Y.S.2d at 836.
29. See Asian Anis., 72"N.Y.2d at 131, 527 N.E.2d at 270, 531 N.Y.S.2d
at 787; see also Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 550-51, 540
N.E.2d 215, 217, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141 (1989) (stating that legislative acts
must have a reasonable relation to the governmental interest sought to be
achieved).
30. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
31. 7illes Inv. Co., 74 N.Y.2d at 887, 547 N.E.2d at 91, 547 N.Y.S.2d at
837 (quoting Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178,
188, 306 N.E.2d 155, 159, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129, 136 (1973)).
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problems; and whether the amendment was consistent with the
32
comprehensive plan.

If the court finds that the amendments were made in a
piecemeal fashion or by "'irrational ad hocery,"' it will not be
sustained. 33 However, application of a zoning classification upon
property does not result in the vested right to have the property
classified this way indefinitely. 34 Along the same lines, a plaintiff
does not have an automatic right to have his parcel zoned to
maximize its value or to permit its most appropriate use where an
35
ordinance is otherwise constitutional.
In Udell v. Haas,3 6 the New York Court of Appeals detailed

some of the evidence and questions which New York courts must
consider in determining whether the local government gave
consideration to the public welfare prior to the rezoning
amendment or regulation. First, the Udell court emphasized the
question of whether the local government made a careful and

deliberate review of the present and reasonably foreseeable needs
of the community and whether the local government adopted a

general development policy or comprehensive plan for the
community as a whole. 3 7 Udell held that where local officials
32. See, e.g., id.; Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 550-55, 540 N.E.2d at 217-20,
542 N.Y.S.2d at 141-44. In Caviglia, the court found that the ordinance was
created only after an exhaustive study was done on the community.
Furthermore, the court found that the underlying data of the study "supported
its conclusion that the presence of [adult entertainment or sex businesses] bad a
deleterious effect on the quality of life in the communities" of Islip and that it
was adopted along with a comprehensive plan for the purpose of the
development of Islip as a whole. Id. at 552, 540 N.E.2d at 218, 542 N.Y.S.2d
at 142.
33. Randolph v. Town of Brookhaven, 37 N.Y.2d 544, 547, 387 N.E.2d
763, 765, 375 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318 (1975) (quoting Town of Bedford, 33
N.Y.2d at 188, 78, 306 N.E.2d at 159, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 136 (1973)).
34. McGowan v. Cohalan, 41 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 361 N.E.2d 1025, 1028,
393 N.Y.S.2d 376, 379 (1977) (holding that local zoning officials, absent
arbitrariness, are the proper authorities for assessing public interest).
35. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962).
36. 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968).
37. Id. at 470, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
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adopt a zoning amendment to deal with various problems that
have arisen but "give no consideration to alternatives which
might minimize the adverse effects of a change on particular
landowners... closer judicial scrutiny is required to determine
whether the amendment conforms to the comprehensive plan." 38
Second, the court stated that all of the relevant evidence must
be examined in order to determine if the ordinance was enacted
pursuant to a "comprehensive plan," which includes an analysis
of the ordinance in terms of consistency and rationality.3 9 Third,
the court explained that the requirement that the rezoning be in
accord with a comprehensive plan, is necessary to ensure that the
needs of the community at large are taken into consideration. 4 0
The court stated that the "thought behind the requirement is that
consideration must be given to the needs of the community as a
whole."41
The New York Court of Appeals, in Asian Americans for
Equality v. Koch, reaffirmed the Udell requirement, holding that
in order to determine the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' claim, it
must be shown that the municipality failed to follow a
comprehensive and well-considered plan. 42 The court stated that
a "court may satisfy itself that the municipality has a well38. Id.
39. Id. at 471, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 895. In addition, the
court noted that "[w]hile these elements are important, the 'comprehensive
plan' that the rezoning should not conflict with the fundamental land use
policies and development plans of the community." Id. at 472, 235 N.E.2d at
902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 895-96.
40. Id. at 469, 235 N.E.2d at 900, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 893. The court stated

that "in exercising their zoning powers, the local authorities must act for the
benefit of the community as a whole following a calm and deliberate
consideration of the alternatives, and not because of the whims of either an
articulate minority or even majority of the community." Id. (citing DeSena v.
Guide, 24 A.D.2d 165, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2d Dep't 1965)).
41. Id.
42. Asian Ars. for Equality v. Koch, 72 N.Y.2d 121, 527 N.E.2d 265,
531 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1988).
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considered plan and that authorities are acting in the public
interest to further it by examining all available and relevant
evidence of the municipality's land use policies." 43 Therefore,
presently, when a zoning ordinance is amended, a New York
court decides whether it accords with a well-considered plan "by
determining whether the original plan required the amendment
because of the community's change and growth and whether the
amendment is calculated to benefit the community as a whole as
44
opposed to benefiting individuals or a group of individuals."
II.WHEN DOES A REZONING CONSTITUTE A
TAKING?
A. Regulation Goes Too Far
The Supreme Court has long held that a land use regulation
constitutes a "taking" when it "does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests," 45 or "denies an owner economically

43. Id. at 131, 527 N.E.2d at 269, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 792 (1988) (citing
Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 470-72, 235 N.E.2d at 901-02, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894-95).
44. Id. See Los-Green, Inc. v. Weber, 156 A.D.2d 994, 548 N.Y.S.2d
832 (4th Dep't 1989). The Weber court annulled a rezoning as arbitrary and
not in accordance with a comprehensive plan by finding that prior to the
rezoning of the subject parcel, no report or recommendations were made that
such parcel be rezoned. 1d. at 994, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 833. The court concluded:
"In sum, the record contains no evidence that the Town Board considered a
specific comprehensive plan in rezoning the subject parcel, and Supreme Court
correctly concluded that determination was arbitrary and capricious." Id. at
995, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
45. Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928). See Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104
(1978); Seawall Assocs. v. City of N.Y.; 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059,
544 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1989).
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viable use of his land." 4 6 This rule is followed by the New York

State courts. 47 Consequently, to state a claim that a plaintiff's
property has been taken, the complaint must allege that the
zoning regulations do not substantially advance legitimate
governmental interests or that they deny an ownpr economically
viable use of its land. 4 8 In regard to the latter claim, the proper
test in New York is whether a reasonable return on the property
49
can presently be received by the owner.

B. Refusal to Process a Site PlanApplication
Where a municipality has delayed issuance of a sought-after
permit, or has hindered an applicant from obtaining the permit he
or she seeks, established law mandates application of the law as it
50
existed at the time the application for the permit was made.
46. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at
834; Agins, 447 U.S. at 260; Seawall Assocs., 74 N.Y.2d at 107, 542 N.E.2d
at 1065, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
47. See, e.g., Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of N.Y., 39 N.Y.2d 587,
596, 350 N.E.2d 381, 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 10 (1976) (stating that zoning
ordinances are unreasonable if they destroy, or effectively destroy, the
economic value of property by denying the owner any reasonable moneymaking or other private use of the property by declaring such use unsuitable).
48. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
49. McGowan v. Cohalan, 41 N.Y.2d 434, 436, 361 N.E.2d 1025, 1027,
393 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (1976).
50. See Dubow v. Ross, 254 A.D. 706, 3 N.Y.S.2d 862 (2d Dep't 1938).
The Appellate Division, Second Department stated:
Ifit be found that public officials charged with the duty of issuing
permits willfully withheld and refused to issue one to petitioner, and, in
addition, misled and hindered him, to the end that if they had acted with
reasonable promptness his permit would have been granted and he could
have conducted the business so as to acquire a vested right prior to the
amendment of the zoning ordinance, we are of the opinion that he would
be entitled to the relief which he seeks.
Id. at 707, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 863-64; see also Pittsford Plaza Assocs. v. Spiegel,
66 N.Y.2d 717, 487 N.E.2d 902, 496 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1985) (stating that where
a site plan application is denied, judicial review is limited to whether denial
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This principle, first set forth by the Appellate Division, Second
Department in Dubow v. Ross, 5 1 has been reaffirmed by the
Second Department, 52 as well as by the New York Court of
Appeals. 53
In Dean Tarry Corp. v. Friedlander,54 the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the notion
that site plan approval is a mere formality. There, the court held
that the plaintiff lacked a cognizable property right in having its
plan approved because it was within the discretion of the
planning board to reject plaintiffs site plan due to the plan's
effect on the welfare and safety of the public. 55
More recently, the Second Circuit in RR! Realty Corp. v.
IncorporatedVillage of Southampton56 noted that, "the degree of

scrutiny appropriate for federal courts... is less rigorous than
that applied by state courts in determining whether such decisionmaking [by local governmental agencies] is arbitrary for purposes
of violating state zoning law. ' 57 The court .concluded that
plaintiff had not been improperly denied a building permit
because plaintiff failed to establish entitlement sufficient to
constitute a property interest. 58

was arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence); Our Lady
of Good Counsel Roman Catholic Church and Sch. v. Ball, 38 N.Y.2d 780,

345 N.E.2d 338, 381 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1975) (holding that applicant who
satisfied requirements for permit should not be penalized where unexplained
delay by city agency occurred prior to amendment of statute).
51. Dubow, 254 A.D. at 706, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
52. James A. Klein Enters., Inc. v. Braatz, 51 A.D.2d 1021, 381
N.Y.S.2d 304 (2d Dep't 1976).

53. Our Lady of Good Counsel Roman Catholic Church and Sch. v. Ball,
38 N.Y.2d 780, 345 N.E.2d 338, 381 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1975).
54. 826 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1987).
55. Id. at 213.

56. 870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 (1989).
57. Id. at 914 n.1.
58. Id. at 912.
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C. Limited Imposition to Develop
In Penn Central TransportationCo. y. City of New York, 5 9 the
Supreme Court established that a limited imposition on a
plaintiff's right to develop the parcel that he owns does not
constitute a "taking. "60 In that case, the Supreme Court ratified

New York City's prohibition on the construction of a fifty-three
story building on top of the Grand Central Station in the face of
the City's claim that another tower would interfere with the
61
comprehensive plan for preserving the landmark station.
The Court implied that a "taking" does not occur where the
regulation advances some public interest and falls short of
destroying all economically viable use. 62 Similarly, in Agins v.
City of Tiburon,63 the Court addressed a rezoning which
preserved open space and limited residential development. In
declining to find a "taking," the Court held that the ordinance did

59. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
60. Id. at 130. The Supreme Court stated:
[T]he submission that appellants may establish a "taking" simply by
showing that they have been denied that ability to exploit a property
interest that they heretofore had believed was available for development
is quite simply untenable .... "Taking" jurisprudence does not divide
a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding
whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this
Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a
whole.
Id. at 130-31. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). The Court stated that
"the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a
taking. At least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property ights,
the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the
aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." Id. at 65-66.
61. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 116-17.
62. Id.
63. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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not prevent appellant from pursuing reasonable investment
64
expectations; nor did it eliminate fundamental ownership.
Six years later, in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of
Yolo, 65 the Supreme Court, in following the reasoning set forth
in Agins, held that a municipality's refusal to permit a single
intensive development desired by a property owner did not
constitute a "taking," and it did not preclude less intensive
66
development by the property owner.
In addition, the Second Circuit again rejected arguments that an
alleged reduction in the return on an investment supports a
"taking" claim. First, in Sadowsky v. City of New York, 67 the
court stated that a "taking" will not necessarily be found even
where the economic impact on the property owner is prohibited
from the "most profitable or beneficial" use of his property. 6 8 In
this regard, the crucial inquiry is not whether remaining use of
the property would be profitable, but whether the property is
sufficiently desirable to permit the sale of the property to another
69
for that use.

Second, in Park Avenue Town Associates v. City of New
York, 70 property owners alleged that the rezoning amounted to an
unconstitutional "taking" because it deprived them of a
64. See id. at 262; see also MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of
Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (holding that refusal to permit intensive
development as desired by property owner did not prevent less intensive
development by landowner).
65. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
66. Id. at 353. The Court held:
A governmental entity is not required to permit a landowner to develop
property to [the] full extent he might desire or be charged with an
unconstitutional taking of the property. Here, as in Agins, the refusal of
the defendants to permit the intensive development desired by the
landowner does not preclude less intensive, but still valuable
development. Accordingly, the complaint falls to state a cause of action.
Id. at 347.
67. 732 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1984).
68. Id. at 317.
69. Id. at 318.
70. 746 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087 (1985).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/6

14

Likourezos: Local Government Rezoning

1995]

LOCAL GOVER MENT REZONING

667

"reasonable return" on their investment, as well as destroyed the
economic value of the property. 7 1 The court stated that a "loss of
a profit-much less [a] loss of a reasonable r.etum-alone [did not]
constitute a taking." 72 Therefore, the court affirmed summary
judgment in facor of the defendants. 73
Similarly, in Pompa Construction Corp. v. City of Saratoga
Springs,74 in applying the Agins formulation, the court
emphasized that the key inquiry in determining whether a
restriction of one's property is so economically burdensome as to
constitute a "taking," is not whether the regulation allows the
landowner to operate the property as "a profitable enterprise" but
whether others "might be interested in purchasing all or part of
the land" for permitted uses. 75

71. Id. at 137.

72. Id. at 139.
73. Id. at 141.
74. 706 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that key question regarding site of
religious worship is whether it might be resold to religious groups, not whether
place of worship in question could be profitable f6r plaintiffs).
75. Id. at 424.
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D. Remedy For PropertyDeprivation

Monetary relief is the appropriate remedy to compensate a
landowner where a regulation deprived him or her of all
reasonable economic use of his property, even if that deprivation
was temporary. 76 Such relief is also recoverable when the court
77
finds that the regulation has effected a "taking."

III. VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
A. Denial of Equal Protection

A violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes liability on the municipality responsible for
such violation. 7 8 In Monell v. New York City Department of
Social Services,79 the Supreme Court held that municipal entities
are proper section 1983 defendants, and can be held liable for
municipal policy made by its lawmakers absent immunity. 80 In

76. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482
U.S. 304, 318 (1987) (holding that the Constitution requires compensation for
temporary and permanent takings); Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833
F.2d 267 (1lth Cir. 1987). In Wheeler, a landowner who suffered a temporary
regulatory "taking" was held to be entitled to "the market rate return computed
over the period of the temporary taking on the difference between the
property's fair market value without the regulatory restriction and its fair value
with the restriction." Id. at 271.
77. FirstEnglish Evangelical, 482 U.S. at 318.
78. Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding
that municipality is not immune from liability where found to have arbitrarily
violated complainants' Fourteenth Amendment rights).
79. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
80. Id. at 701.
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addition, local officials are also subject to liability under section
1983 in their individual capacity. 8 1

Pursuant to section 1983, a municipality is subject to liability if
it was the municipality's "official policy" that led to plaintiffs
injury. 82 Accordingly, a municipality may be held liable under
section 1983 for even a single decision by its properly constituted
legislative body, because even a single decision by such a body
constitutes an act or official government policy. 83
Relief under section 1983 is available if the action complained
of involved a denial of equal protection, and the violation of the
constitutional right is complete when the action took place. 84 In
New York, pursuant to article 78,85 an individual may initiate an
81. City of Newport v. Fact Concepts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (holding
that city officials are liable in their individual capacity pursuant to § 1983 for
the cancellation of respondents' license).
82. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (stating that
a municipality is not liable pursuant to § 1983 unless it was the "policy" or
"custom" of the municipality that led to the constitutional violation); Bateson
v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988). The court stated that a municipality
is liable, provided that the alleged action "unconstitutional[ly] implements or
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially
adopted and promulgated [by the local governmental body] and [such policy
statement, ordinance, regulation or officially adopted decision] caused the
constitutional violation." Id. at 1303 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690).
83. See, e.g., St. Louis v. Praprotnick, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (stating that
municipality is not liable unless plaintiff proves existence of an unconstitutional
policy enacted by officials with the authority to make such policy); Pembaur v.
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (holding that municipality will be liable under
§ 1983 only for acts it officially ordered or sanctioned).
84. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (holding
that plaintiff is entitled to relief where deprivation of protected property
interest was finalized).
85. N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. art. 78 (McKinney 1981). Section 7803
provides that:
The only questions that may be raised in a proceeding under this article
are:
1. whether the body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined upon it
by law; or
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action in state court and seek traditional common law and
statutory remedies available under state law under section 1983.
The availability of these state remedies, however, does not
preclude a remedy under the Federal Constitution. 86
To state an equal protection claim in a land use case, a plaintiff
must allege that the local government treated the plaintiff's
property differently than other property similarly situated, and
that the different treatment had no rational relation to a legitimate
state interest. 87 In a land use case, a complaint brought pursuant
to section 1983, must allege the use of excessive and
unreasonable regulation by the local New York State agency. In
addition, it must allege that a "person" has deprived the plaintiff
of a federal constitutional right, and that the person who deprived
the plaintiff of that right acted under "color" of state law. 88
Under the equal protection standard of judicial review of a
rezoning restriction, the New York State courts will invalidate
2. whether the body or officer proceeded, is proceeding or is about to
proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction; or
3. whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure,
was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or
an abuse of discretion, including abuse of discretion as to the
measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed; or
4. whether a determination made as a result of a hearing held, and at
which evidence was taken, pursuant to direction by law is, on the
entire record, supported by substantial evidence.
Id.

86. See generallyMonell, 436 U.S. 658.
87. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985) (holding that complainants who were deprived of special use permit for
proposed group home for mentally retarded, were denied equal protection
because mental retardation had no rational relation to denial of permit); New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (stating that city could have rationally
chosen to eliminate newer businesses and instead retain older established
businesses); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)
(holding that state may regulate interstate commerce of only certain products
where the regulated products could be injurious to health).
88. See, e.g., Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (stating that a complaint pursuant to § 1983 must
allege that state officials were acting under color of state law).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/6

18

Likourezos: Local Government Rezoning

19951

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REZONING

the rezoning if it is arbitrary and does not bear a rational or
substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. 89 In
New York, a plaintiff need not establish confiscation in order to
prove discrimination. 90 Furthermore, if the zoning of plaintiffs
property is found to have been discriminatory, plaintiff is then
permitted to have a change in zoning in order to remedy that
discrimination. 91
B. Remedy ForAn Equal Protection Violation
A remedy for denial of equal protection is available in zoning
cases, particularly where the purpose of the rezoning was not to
implement a comprehensive plan, but to carry out the wishes of a
small vocal minority of individuals. 92 Where a lawsuit is brought
directly under the Constitution, on the ground that the local
regulatory action asserted under the police'power is excessive and
constitutes a "taldng" under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, money damages
can be recovered. 93 But where the action is brought under section
1983, money damages can be recovered merely upon proof of a
deprivation of rights under color of state law, such as in the
89. Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Brighton, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136
N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956) (stating that the concept of exclusive
zoning must be examined only within the realm of regional needs and practical
considerations).

90. Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888
(1968).

91. See, e.g., Jurgens v. Town of Huntington, 53 A.D.2d 661, 384
N.Y.S.2d 870 (2d Dep't 1976); Vigilant Investors Corp. v. Town of
Hempstead, 34 A.D.2d 990, 312 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (2d Dep't 1970).
92. City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(stating that a decision on a project based merely on the negative attitudes of
neighbors is a violation of equal protection).
93. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (holding that monetary
damages are proper where plaintiff was deprived of his civil rights by
physically abusive police officer).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1995

19

Touro Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1995], Art. 6

672

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 11

excessive use of police power in regulating land use, without the
necessity of proving action which amounts to a "taking." 94
In addition, individuals whose federal constitutional or
statutory rights are abridged may secure injunctive relief, 95 and
attorneys' fees. 96 In 1980, the Supreme Court made it clear that

the attorney's fee statute, 97 which pertains to section 1983
claims, is equally applicable in federal and state court section
1983 actions. 98
CONCLUSION

An amendment to a zoning regulation in New York will be
found to constitute a "taking" when the amendment was not in
accordance with a well-considered plan and the land use
regulation does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests, or when it denies an owner economically viable use of
his land. 99 To determine whether a zoning ordinance or
amendment is consistent with a well-considered plan, courts in
New York consider whether the original plan was required for
the amendment, the community's change and growth, and
whether the amendment is calculated to benefit the community as
a whole, as opposed to benefiting individuals or a group of
individuals. 100 Monetary relief is the usual remedy where the
94. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of
L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that compensation is mandatory where
challenged regulation had been excessive)..
95. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 55 (1984).
96. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989); Texas Teacher Ass'n v.
Garland Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131

(1988).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). Section 1988 provides in pertinent part:
"(b) In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections ... 19811983... the court, in its discretion may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." Id.
98. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980).
99. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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land use regulation is determined to have been arbitrary or
confiscatory. 1 01
GeorgeLikourezos

101. See supranotes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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